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THE ASBESTOS LITIGATION SYSTEM IN THE
SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA: A PARADIGM OF
THE NATIONAL ASBESTOS LITIGATION CRISIS
Dominica C. Anderson, Esq.*
Kathryn L. Martin, Esq.**
I. INTRODUCTION
Northern California courts' are experiencing a crisis in
the handling and resolution of asbestos-related bodily injury
lawsuits. The size of the asbestos docket, the number of de-
fendants, the variety of competing interests among the par-
ties involved, and a history of judicial band-aids has left the
asbestos litigation system in a grave state of disrepair, if not
"verging upon the edge of collapse."' This article explores a
* B.A. (1983) high honors, U.C. Berkeley; J.D. (1986) University of San Fran-
cisco. Ms. Anderson is a partner in the San Francisco office of Hancock Rothert
& Bunshoft LLP. Her current practice focuses on insurance coverage and busi-
ness litigation, with an emphasis on complex litigation. Ms. Anderson has ex-
tensive experience in a variety of civil litigation matters involving asbestos,
toxic torts, and other health hazards. She currently sits on Hancock, Rothert &
Bunshof's Management Committee and is the co-chair of the firm's Domestic
Insurance Practice group.
** B.A. (1999) University of California, Los Angeles; J.D. (2003), cum laude,
University of California, Hastings College of Law, member of the Hastings
Women's Law Journal. Ms. Martin is a former associate in the law firm of Han-
cock Rothert & Bunshoft LLP.
1. This article focuses on San Francisco and Alameda Counties, the largest
and most active civil courts in Northern California.
2. Defense counsel recently filed a declaration in support of a motion to va-
cate all cases filed by one particular law firm stating, "this Declarant believes
that a firm intervention is necessary from the Court in order to restore order to
a system which is verging upon the edge of collapse." See Carroll, Burdick &
McDonough LLP's Decl. of James G. Scadden in Support of Volkswagen of
America, Inc.'s et al. Joinder in Designated Defense Counsel's Motion to Vacate
All Brayton Cases at 2, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super. Ct. S.F.
County Oct. 23, 2004) (No. 828684).
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variety of problems and issues that exist under the current
system and possible solutions Northern California courts
could implement to improve their ability to dispose of these
cases in a fair and expeditious manner.
Every year, there are approximately 2000 asbestos cases
pending in Northern California.3 Approximately 800 cases
are filed annually in San Francisco County alone.4 In Decem-
ber 2003, nearly 300 cases were scheduled for trial-setting.5
The sheer number of cases pending at any given time results
in a virtually unmanageable asbestos docket. Not surpris-
ingly, Alameda and San Francisco County have both been
recognized as among the United States' "Judicial Hellholes."6
In San Francisco, the court system places no limit on the
number of cases that can be assigned a trial date.7 If all of
the eligible cases evaluated at the trial setting conference are
presumed ready for trial, they are given trial dates.8 How-
ever, many of the cases are usually not ready for trial, and
the ensuing rescheduling and push to get the cases to trial
creates utter chaos.9 The large number of cases in the discov-
ery stage makes it nearly impossible for defense counsel to
keep up with their day-to-day schedules. On average, fifteen
3. Thirteen judges in San Francisco are responsible for handling all of the
asbestos litigation. See Hon. Alfred Chiantelli (Ret.), Asbestos Litigation & Tort
Law: Trends, Ethics, & Solutions: Judicial EfiTciency in Asbestos Litigation, 31
PEPP. L. REV. 171, 171 (2003).
4. See Jackson & Wallace LLP's Joinder in Owens-Illinois' Motion for a
Case Management Order Regarding Unimpaired Cases at 2, In Re Complex As-
bestos Litigation (Super. Ct. Alameda County Nov. 7, 2003) (No. 607734-9)
[hereinafter Joinder].
5. See Designated Defense Counsel Berry & Berry's Status Report and
Recommendations to the Court Regarding Upcoming Brayton Status and Set-
ting Conferences at 1, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super. Ct. S.F.
County Apr. 1, 2004) (No. 828684) [hereinafter Berry & Berry Brief].
6. While both San Francisco and Alameda Counties were on the list in
2002, in 2003 both were off the list. AM. TORT REFORM ASSOC., BRINGING
JUSTICE TO JUDICIAL HELLHOLES at 2-3 (2003), available at
http://www.atra.org/reportsihellholes (last visited Oct. 18, 2004).
7. See generally S.F. COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 6.
8. The Presiding Judge in the San Francisco Superior Court may require,
upon request of any party, that the plaintiffs deposition be completed before
trial will be set. See generally General Order 129, In re Complex Asbestos Liti-
gation (Super. Ct. S.F. County Jan. 1, 1997) (No. 828684) [hereinafter S.F. Gen.
Order No. 129]. In Alameda, cases are set for trial at the judge's discretion. See
ALAMEDA COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 4.5.
9. See Letter from Lynn P. Blair of Berry & Berry to Hon. Donna Hitchens,
In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super. Ct. S.F. County May 29, 2003) (No.
828684) [herinafter Berry & Berry Letter].
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to twenty plaintiff depositions may be scheduled to take place
in any given week." Cancellation of these depositions occurs
on a regular basis," often immediately before the deposition is
to begin and sometimes after the parties have already trav-
eled great distances to attend. 2 Only one law firm, the "Des-
ignated Defense Counsel,"'" is allowed to schedule plaintiff
depositions for all cases.14 As a result, this law firm alone has
access to information regarding the scheduling and reschedul-
ing of key depositions for all 2,000 asbestos cases and for all
300 defense firms involved in the litigation."' Finally, quite
frequently, new defendants are added at the last minute, af-
ter discovery is complete, and after trial is scheduled. 6 This
creates an administrative nightmare for counsel as well as for
the courts.
This article addresses the following specific issues which
currently contribute to the situation the courts and litigants
face in Northern California asbestos litigation: (1) docket
management issues (e.g., too many cases scheduled to go for-
ward at any given time, undermining the parties and the ju-
dicial system);" (2) unrealistically short timelines for taking
asbestos cases to trial (a timely issue in light of the courts' re-
cent dismantling of the "Fast Track" and related rules); 8 (3)
issues with the Designated Defense Counsel system; and, (4)
10. Id.
11. See, e.g, Plaintiff Depositions, available at
http://www.berryandberry.com/main/PlaintiffDepos.aspx (according to Desig-
nated Defense Counsel's website on any given week several of the depositions
are cancelled or rescheduled) (last visited Dec. 19, 2004).
12. Transcript of Oct. 31, 2003, Hearing on Motion to Compel Audit of Berry
& Berry as Designated Defense Counsel, at 5, ln. 10-15, In re Complex Asbestos
Litigation, S.F. Civ. No. 828684.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. Revised General Order 14.00, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation at 6
(Super. Ct. Alameda County Sept. 3, 1993) (No. 607734-9) [hereinafter Alameda
Gen. Order 14.00]; Revised General Order 41, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation
at 6 (Super. Ct. S.F. County Sept. 3, 1993) (No. 828684) [hereinafter S.F. Gen.
Order 41].
15. See S.F. Gen. Order 41, supra note 14, at 5-6; Alameda Gen. Order
14.00, supra note 14, at 5-6.
16. See, e.g., Allgood v. Asbestos Defendants, S.F. Civ. No. 320887. New
defendants were added three years after the complaint was filed, and after the
case was set for trial. Docket list available at http://www.sftc.org (last visited
Nov. 14, 2004) (docket list on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
17. See infra Part II.
18. Trial Court Delay Reduction Act of 1990, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 68600-20
(West 2004).
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the effect of the bankrupt entities' "empty chair" in relation to
Proposition 51.1' This broad-brush list of problems, while ex-
pansive, is in no way intended to be exhaustive of the issues
litigants face in Northern California asbestos litigation.
This article suggests some fairly simple strategies to be-
gin correcting the problems. In order to allow courts to
maximize their efficiency and counsel to be more fully pre-
pared to defend their cases, we propose the following strate-
gies for administration and management of the Northern
California asbestos docket:"
" Implementation of an inactive docket system that
would preclude "unimpaired" cases from proceed-
ing, unless and until plaintiffs could show im-
pairment based on generally accepted medical cri-
teria.21 This would reduce the number of cases
going through the court system by at least sixty-
five percent,22 thereby reducing the current "clog"
in the system;
* Abolish the presumption that asbestos cases
should be rushed to trial. If, as a rule, cases were
not presumed ready to be set for trial within a
year of their original filing, the courts would not
be forced to repeatedly reschedule status and set-
ting conferences. And, where a newly discovered
defendant is added to the case, scheduled trial
dates should automatically be vacated or contin-
ued in order to afford defendants adequate time to
prepare for trial;
* Administrative duties now performed by Desig-
nated Defense Counsel, including scheduling of
discovery and record procurement, should be allo-
cated to a vendor, not a law firm, who could per-
19. The Fair Responsibility Act of 1986, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1431-1431.5
(West 2004). This broad-brush list of problems, while expansive, is in no way
intended to be exhaustive of the issues litigants face in Northern California as-
bestos litigation.
20. In addition to these proposals, this article also analyzes Proposition 51,
California Civil Code sections 1431-1431.5, and its effect on Northern California
asbestos litigation. See infra Part V.
21. The term "unimpaired" refers to a claim filed by a plaintiff who is not
functionally impaired, i.e. has no physical symptoms or limitations as a result of
the alleged injury.
22. See Joinder, supra note 4, at 1-2, as referring to Jackson & Wallace LLP
cases.
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form such tasks more efficiently and economically,
including the use of modern technology to keep
the parties informed of schedules in "real time."23
II. DOCKET MANAGEMENT ISSUES - THE INACTIVE DOCKET
SOLUTION
Northern California asbestos litigation grows more com-
plex and cumbersome each year, and it appears that this
trend will continue. As such, the courts should act now to
manage the out-of-control docket by implementing an inactive
docket before the problem worsens. Recent examples of the
success of the inactive docket system have been seen in the
courts of New York City, Boston, and several jurisdictions in
Illinois, among others. This is precisely the type of creative
judicial solution needed to allow courts and counsel to effec-
tively manage asbestos litigation.
A. Filing Trends in Northern California
Twenty years ago, over 21,000 asbestos claims had been
filed,24 and by 2000 well over 600,000 claims had been filed.2"
In 2001, approximately 90,000 new cases were filed.26 Accord-
ing to a recent Rand Institute report, there may be millions of
claims that have yet to be filed.27 In addition, the number of
asbestos defendants has grown from approximately 300 in the
early 1980s to more than 8,400 in 2003.28
Many blame the increase in claims filed, and the corre-
sponding increase in the number of defendants sued, on more
23. "Real time" is a technology term meaning in the time that the event ac-
tually happens or shortly thereafter. See Word Definition From the Webopedia
Computer Dictionary, available at
http://www.pcwebopedia.com/TERM/r/realtime.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2004)
(on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
24. STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND
COMPENSATION: AN INTERIM REPORT at 51 (RAND Inst. for Civil Justice 2002),
available at http://www.rand.org/publications/DB/DB397/ (last visited Dec. 19,
2004) [hereinafter Rand Institute Report].
25. Id
26. Federal Judge is Optimistic About Talks on Asbestos Litigation, BEST'S
INS. NEWS, Mar. 26, 2004, available at 2004 WL 61249492; see generally Alex
Berenson, A Surge in Asbestos Suits, Many by Healthy Plaintiffs, N.Y. TIMES,
(Apr. 10, 2002), at Al.
27. Rand Institute Report, supra note 24, at 78.
28. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Congress Should Act To Resolve the National
Asbestos Crisis: The Basis in Law and Public Policy for Meaningful Progress, 44
S. TEX. L. REV. 839, 859 (2003).
2004
6 SANTA CLARA LA WREVIEW Vol: 45
aggressive efforts by plaintiffs' counsel to generate new cli-
ents." Often, these aggressive "recruitment" efforts are car-
ried out using mass screenings, which have suspect results
for several reasons." First and foremost, the diagnoses issued
during mass screenings are not made by a treating or examin-
ing physician and, therefore, cannot as easily be confirmed or
replicated. Also, as a result of these large-scale screenings
in search of potential plaintiffs, a large number of all new
claims are brought by persons with either minor lung im-
pairment or no lung impairment at all. 32
A prominent California plaintiffs' attorney recognized
this problem when testifying before Congress in 2002, stating,
[t]he engine that drives the filing of non-malignant cases
is litigation screening. The Manville Trust 3 estimates
that as many as 90% of non-cancer claims are generated
29. AM. ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, OVERVIEW OF ASBESTOS ISSUES AND
TRENDS, PUBLIC POLICY MONOGRAPH at 3 (December 2001) [hereinafter Actuar-
ies Report].
30. See Lester Brickman, Asbestos Litigation & Tort Law: Trends, Ethics, &
Solutions: On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Discon-
nect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 38 (2004). "Screen-
ings" refers to plaintiffs lawyers herding large numbers of workers through
"examobiles" or vans equipped with x-ray machines. See Raymark Industries,
Inc. v. Stemple, No. 88-1014-K, 1990 WL 72588, at *1, *14 (D. Kan. May 30,
1990). These x-rays are often a plaintiffs only basis for the diagnosis of an as-
bestos-related disease and do not reflect other generally accepted protocol for
medical diagnosis of asbestos-related disease. Id. at *14. And, the screenings
are free to the claimants because the lawyers pay for them and are often con-
ducted by out-of-state lawyers and screening companies, and sometimes out-of-
state doctors. Id. at *3. See also Letter From Judge Sharon S. Armstrong in
King County, Washington, Re: ACR XXIII Summary Judgment Motions to
Counsel and Parties (Oct. 15, 2002) (dismissing certain silica suits brought on
behalf of plaintiffs diagnosed through screening services) (on file with the Santa
Clara Law Review).
31. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH)
evaluated the x-rays of 795 "tire workers" who had been diagnosed through
screening and found that, "only two had any signs of parenchymal change and
only 19 [of the 795] showed pleural abnormalities." See Raymark, 1990 WL
72588 at *16; see also David E. Bernstein, Asbestos Litigation & Tort Law:
Tends, Ethics, & Solutions: Keeping Junk Science Out of Asbestos Litigation,
31 PEPP. L. REV. 11, 11-13 (2004).
32. See Actuaries Report, supra note 29, at 3; see also Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 631 (1997) (quoting Christopher F. Edley, Jr. & Paul
C. Weiler, Asbestos: A Multi-Billion-Dollar Crisis, 30 HARV. J. LEGIS. 383, 384,
393 (1993) ("up to one-half of asbestos claims are now being filed by people who
have little or no physical impairment")).
33. The Trust is set up to handle and process the claims through the Johns
Manville Bankruptcy Trust. See Manville Personal Injury Settlement Thust,
available athttp://www.mantrust.org/history.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
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through screenings ....
Litigation screenings have absolutely nothing to do with
medicine - they are a device for recruiting clients ....
The results of such screenings are totally unreliable. 3
In fact, the 2002 Rand Report found that, although the
combined number of mesothelioma and other cancer filings
had remained almost constant since 1990, the number of non-
cancer claims had almost tripled since 1990."5 In San Fran-
cisco alone, over 2,000 asbestos cases are currently pending."
It is estimated that over sixty-five percent of all asbestos
claims are filed by claimants who are functionally "unim-
paired," as defined by the American Bar Association in Feb-
ruary 2003.37 In fact, one of the most visible plaintiffs' law-
yers in Northern California recently stated publicly that close
to seventy percent of the claims filed by his office would not
34. See Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Oversight Hearing Before the Sen.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 20-23 (Sept. 25, 2002) (statement of Ste-
ven Kazan, Partner of Kazan, McClain, Edises, Abrams, Fernandez, Lynons &
Farrise) [herinafter Statement of Steven Kazan].
35. Rand Institute Report, supra note 24, at 44.
36. See Chiantelli, supra note 3, at 171.
37. In February 2003, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
passed a resolution calling for Congress to adopt legislation that would defer the
claims of "unimpaireds," while tolling all applicable statutes of limitations, until
the claimants are able to satisfy medical criteria of an impairment. See Asbes-
tos Litigation Crisis: Oversight Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. on the Judici-
ary, 108th Cong. at 4, 14 (Mar. 5, 2003) (statement of Hon. Dennis Archer,
President-elect, American Bar Ass'n) [hereinafter ABA Guidelines]. The medi-
cal criteria recommended by the ABA were based on guidelines similar to those
adopted by the American Thoracic Society. Id. at 15. The ABA Commission in-
terviewed several nationally recognized pulmonologists and other medical spe-
cialists with extensive knowledge of asbestos-related non-malignant conditions
to determine the objective medical criteria which would constitute the threshold
level of asbestos-related injury that would permit a plaintiffs case to be placed
on an active docket. See id. at 10-12. Based on those interviews, the ABA
Commission promulgated a Standard for Non-Malignant Asbestos-Related Dis-
ease Claims (the "ABA Standard"). See id. at app. B. The ABA Standard is also
based both on guidelines for diagnosing asbestos-related conditions which have
been published by the American Thoracic Society (a division of the American
Lung Association) and on guidelines for the evaluation of impairment published
by the American Medical Association. See id. See also AM. THORACIC SOCY,
OFFICIAL STATEMENT: THE DIAGNOSIS OF NONMALIGNANT DISEASES RELATED
TO ASBESTOS, 134 AM. REV. RESP. Dis. 363-368 (Mar. 1986); AM. THORACIC
Soc'Y, LUNG FUNCTION TESTING: SELECTION OF REFERENCE VALUES AND
INTERPRETIVE STRATEGIES, 144 AM. REV. RESP. Dis. 1202- 1218 (1991).
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meet those ABA medical criteria.38
Across the country, the majority of asbestos claimants
exhibit no impairment, or even symptoms. Their lung func-
tion is normal; they suffer no pain or shortness of breath.
They do not run an increased risk of cancer. In fact, they may
never become impaired. Based on similar findings, several
leading jurisdictions in the United States have implemented
some form of an "inactive docket" system, prohibiting recov-
ery for claims unless and until the plaintiff can show evidence
of actual impairment.39
This section analyzes types of inactive dockets imple-
mented in other jurisdictions, and the appropriateness of im-
plementing an inactive docket in Northern California to pre-
vent unimpaired claims from continuing to consume the
courts.
B. Inactive Dockets in Other Jurisdictions
Many courts have already taken steps to give priority to
asbestos claimants who are truly sick. Inactive dockets,
sometimes called "deferred dockets" or "pleural registries,"
are court-implemented systems that defer the claims of un-
impaired plaintiffs by moving claims to an "inactive docket."'
This allows the claims of truly impaired plaintiffs to be heard
more promptly.' In an inactive docket, plaintiffs do not lose
38. Alan Brayton, Asbestos Litigation & Tort Law: Trends, Ethics, & Solu-
tions: Alternatives to Asbestos Impairment Standards, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 29, 30
(2003).
39. See infra Part II.B; see also Hancock Rothert & Bunshoft LLP's London
Market Insurers' Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Defendant Owens-Illinois,
Inc.'s Motion for Docket Management Order Regarding Unimpaired Cases at 9,
In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super. Ct. Alameda County Oct. 24, 2003)
(No. 607734-9). Legal commentators have also praised inactive dockets as an
effective way of handling the unimpaired claims. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, The
Worst Should Go First. Deferred Registries in Asbestos Litigation, 15 HARV. L.
PUB. POL'Y, 561, 568 (1992); Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face
of the Never-Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 MiSS. L. J. 1, 12 (2002); Mark A.
Behrens & Monica G. Parham, Stewardship for the Sick: Preserving Assets for
Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Programs, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1,
13-15 (2001).
40. See, e.g., Order to Establish Registry for Certain Asbestos Matters, In re
Asbestos Cases (Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. Mar. 26, 1991) [hereinafter Cook
County Order].
41. In California, impaired plaintiffs may move for trial preference under
California Code of Civil Procedure section 36 if (a) the plaintiff is over 70 years
old, has a substantial interest, and his health is a factor; (b) the plaintiff is un-
der the age of 14; or (c) there is clear and convincing medical documentation
Vol: 45
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their right to have their cases heard because statutes of limi-
tations are tolled on their claims. Instead, they must simply
wait until they show signs of actual physical impairment.42
At that point, they can have their cases removed to the active
docket and set for trial.
Courts throughout the country have implemented inac-
tive dockets, or deferred registries, in order to enable efficient
and equitable handling of congested asbestos dockets. The
judges in those jurisdictions who have had an opportunity to
see the effects of the inactive docket system consistently re-
port that the plans are working well for all parties involved.43
This article discusses the basic structure and practical impli-
cations of various inactive docket models that have been im-
plemented in courts across the country.
C. Inactive Docket Models
The types of inactive dockets implemented thus far vary
in how they handle claims brought by plaintiffs who are func-
tionally unimpaired. Some courts actually stay claims of un-
impaired plaintiffs until and unless the plaintiffs are able to
demonstrate physical impairment, based on established
medical criteria." Alternatively, other courts simply priori-
tize claims based on levels of impairment, deferring claims of
that plaintiff suffers from an illness or condition raising substantial medical
doubt of survival beyond six months. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 36 (West 2004).
Under section 36(f), upon granting of a motion for preference, the court shall set
the case for trial within 120 days. Id. Once a case is assigned a preferential
trial date, San Francisco General Order 140 governs discovery and motion prac-
tice. General Order 140, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super. Ct. S.F.
County Nov. 15, 1996) (No. 828684). San Francisco General Order 156 governs
expert witnesses. General Order 156, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super.
Ct. S.F. County Nov. 15, 1996) (No. 828684). Similarly, Alameda General Order
11.00 governs preferential trial settings pursuant to California Code of Civil
Procedure section 36. General Order 11.00, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation
(Super. Ct. Alameda County Feb. 1, 1990) (No. 607734-9).
42. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation & Tort Law: Trends, Eth-
ics, & Solutions: Addressing the "Elephantine Mass" of Asbestos Cases: Con-
solidation Versus Inactive Dockets (Pleural Registries) and Case Management
Plans that Defer Claims Filed By the Non-Sick, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 271, 287
(2003).
43. Id. (citing Inactive Asbestos Dockets: Are They Easing the Flow of Liti-
gation? HARRISMARTIN'S COLuMNs: ASBESTOS 2 (Feb. 2002)); see also Memo-
randum Opinion and Order, In re USG Corp. at 8 n.3 (Bankr. Del. Feb. 19,
2003) (No. 01-2094). "The practical benefits of dealing with the sickest claim-
ants first have been apparent to the courts for many years and have led to the
adoption of deferred claims registries in various jurisdictions." Id
44. See, e.g., Cook County Order, supra note 40.
2004
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unimpaired plaintiffs only until the claims of impaired claim-
ants are resolved.45
Under the traditional inactive docket model, any claim
that does not meet set medical criteria is stayed until the
claimant can demonstrate a threshold level of impairment, or
until the parties stipulate to allow the case to move forward.46
This type of system has been implemented in such jurisdic-
tions as Cook County, Illinois," New York City, New York,'
Baltimore, Maryland,49 Syracuse, New York,5° and Madison
County, Illinois.5 The definition of "impairment" is fairly
consistent throughout all these jurisdictions, generally re-
quiring a 1/1 ILO 2 reading or a 1/0 ILO with other reliable
evidence of impairment, which may be established through
pulmonary function testing, that demonstrates reduced forced
vital capacity or total lung capacity.53 This standard is consis-
tent with, if not identical to, the ABA Standard for Non-
Malignant Asbestos-Related Disease Claims.4
45. See, e.g., Order Re: Asbestos-Related Disease Protocol, In re Asbestos
Cases of King County (Super. Ct., King County, Wa., Feb. 3, 2004) (No. 89-2-
18455-9 SEA) [herinafter King County Order].
46. See Cook County Order, supra note 40.
47. Id.
48. Order Amending Prior Case Mgmt. Orders, In re New York City Asbes-
tos Litig., at 2 (Super. Ct. N.Y. Dec. 19, 2002) (No. 40000/88) [hereinafter New
York City Order].
49. Order Establishing an Inactive Docket for Asbestos Personal Injury
Cases, In re Asbestos Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Asbestos Cases (Cir.
Ct. Baltimore City, Md. Dec. 9, 1992) (No. 92344501) [hereinafter Maryland Or-
der].
50. Amendment to Amended Case Mgmt. Order No. 1, In re Fifth Jud. Dist.
Asbestos Litig., at 2 (Super. Ct. N.Y. Jan. 31, 2003).
51. See Order Establishing Asbestos Deferred Registry, In re Asbestos
Cases (Cir. Ct. Madison County, Ill. Jan. 23, 2004) (No. 04 L 00000) [herinafter
Madison Order].
52. ILO refers to radiological ratings of the International Labor Office. ILO
grades are obtained by a physician who grades a chest film as to the most likely
level of severity: 0 for none, 1 for slight, 2 for moderate, and 3 for severe. The
physical then gives a second grade as the next most likely level of severity. See
AMERICAN THORACIC SOCIETY, THE DIAGNOSIS OF NONMALIGNANT DISEASES
RELATED TO ASBESTOS, 134 AMERICAN REVIEW OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE 363,
365-66 (1986).
53. See, e.g., New York City Order, supra note 48.
54. In February 2003, the American Bar Association House of Delegates
passed a resolution calling for Congress to adopt legislation that would defer the
claims of unimpaired plainitffs, while tolling all applicable statute of limita-
tions, until the claimants are able to satisfy medical criteria of an impairment.
The medical criteria recommended by the ABA were based on guidelines similar
to those adopted by the American Thoracic Society. Schwartz, supra note 42, at
297.
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Under the traditional inactive docket, unimpaired plain-
tiffs are actually barred from bringing their claims unless and
until they meet the impairment requirements.55 This system
accomplishes more than simply prioritizing the claims; it ac-
tually prevents unimpaired claimants from litigating their
claim unless and until they are impaired.56 This allows the
courts and parties to focus their resources on the claims of
plaintiffs who are truly sick without the burden of also man-
aging claims of plaintiffs who do not allege injury sufficient to
meet the medical criteria required for removal to the active
docket.
As an alternative to an inactive docket, King County (Se-
attle), Washington recently implemented a modified docket
management system termed "Asbestos-Related Disease Pro-
tocol."57 Under this system, there is no "inactive docket" or
"deferred registry" for unimpaired claims.6 Rather, claims
are prioritized and placed in trial groups based on disease se-
verity and the ability of plaintiffs to meet certain medical cri-
teria. 9 The medical criteria contained in the order are some-
what less stringent than the ABA standards" and the criteria
set forth in the jurisdictions mentioned above.
This distinction is significant because, under the King
County system,6' unimpaired plaintiffs are not prevented
from pursuing their claims; rather, they are simply moved to
the bottom of the docket until the claims of more severely in-
jured plaintiffs are litigated. 2 In a jurisdiction with a lighter
caseload, this model might not significantly affect the number
of unimpaired cases that remain active, because the unim-
paired claims would be allowed to go forward in the absence
of a large number of severely ill plaintiffs.' However, in a
55. See, e.g, Cook County Order, supra note 40.
56. Id.
57. See King County Order, supra note 45.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. The American Bar Association promulgated its own set. See ABA
Guidelines, supra note 37.
61. See King County Order, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
62. Id. This model is not the most effective because it does not rid the court
of the burden of processing unimpaired claims. However, this system is less
drastic than the traditional inactive docket, which might make it a more ac-
ceptable alternative in the eyes of the court; no claimant is barred from the
courthouse door, yet the courts and counsel are able to focus their resources on
the most serious claims first.
63. In addition, the King County system is problematic insofar as the medi-
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court that consistently sees many impaired plaintiffs, this
type of prioritization scheme could have the same practical
effect as the traditional inactive docket: the constant influx of
impaired claims would result in indefinite deferral of claims
brought by plaintiffs who are unimpaired.
Other courts have implemented creative case manage-
ment orders as a means of reducing the burden of handling
claims of unimpaired plaintiffs. For example, the trial judge
who oversees asbestos litigation in West Virginia, Judge Ar-
thur Recht, recently established an "exigent docket," under
which a set number of claims are chosen by plaintiffs' counsel
to move forward on an expedited trial schedule every other
month.' Similarly, in Cleveland, Ohio, the Court of Common
Pleas of Cuyahoga County implemented a case management
order aimed at focusing judicial resources on claims of truly
sick plaintiffs.' Under the order, all upcoming discovery and
trial preparation is focused on groups of plaintiffs who dem-
onstrate substantial impairment.
Finally, Federal District Court Judge Charles Weiner,
who oversees the federal asbestos docket, has entered a court
order that is similar in effect to that of an inactive docket.
Under the order, cases brought by plaintiffs suffering from
mesothelioma or lung cancer are given immediate priority,
while all other cases are placed in disease categories based on
severity." The system works to give priority to "malignancy,
death and total disability cases where the substantial con-
tributing cause is an asbestos-related disease or injury." '
Thousands of cases involving claimants who could not demon-
strate functional impairment have been dismissed without
prejudice based on this prioritization scheme.
All of the case management strategies described above
reflect a general recognition among asbestos jurists that the
growing number of unimpaired asbestos claims is a major
cal criteria are too lenient. For example, to be eligible for trial priority, an as-
bestosis claimant must simply provide evidence of a 1/0 ILO reading.
64. Case Management Order, In re Asbestos Personal Injury Litigation (Cir.
Ct. Kanawha County, W. Va. Mar. 25, 2003) (No. 03-C-9600).
65. General Personal Injury Asbestos Case Management Order No. 1, In re
Cuyahoga County Asbestos Cases (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. Jan. 4, 2002) (Special
Docket No. 73958).
66. Id.
67. Admin. Order No. 3, In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI) (E.D. Pa.
Sept. 8, 1992) (No. MDL 875).
68. Id
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problem modern courts face. As Judge Weiner recognized in
2002, "the filing of mass screening cases is tantamount to a
race to the courthouse and has the effect of depleting funds,
some already stretched to the limit, which would otherwise be
available for compensation to deserving plaintiffs."6 9
D. An Inactive Docket Is the Most Fair, Efficient, and
Effective Means to Resolve the Northern California Docket
Management Issues
An inactive docket system would benefit both impaired
and unimpaired claimants, as well as the courts, in Northern
California. Such a system would enable impaired claimants
to move "to the front of the line," ensuring that their cases
would be heard more quickly, and that they would be com-
pensated before the plaintiffs with little or no actual impair-
ment." In addition, litigating the claims of impaired claim-
ants first ensures that scant financial resources would be
devoted to deserving plaintiffs, which becomes increasingly
important in light of the growing number of defendants who
are forced into bankruptcy.7'
The creation of an inactive docket would also preserve
indefinitely the claims of unimpaired plaintiffs, preventing
them from being time-barred and allowing the plaintiffs to
proceed when and if their injuries manifest. Although Cali-
fornia's provision regarding the statute of limitations for fil-
ing an asbestos personal injury claim is relatively favorable to
plaintiffs, unimpaired claimants may nonetheless be inclined
to file suit prematurely for fear that their right to bring a
claim may expire before they have any cognizable injury.
69. Admin. Order No. 8, In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI) (E.D. Pa.
Jan. 15, 2002) (No. MDL 875).
70. See Behrens, supra note 39, at 6. An attorney from Oakland, Califor-
nia's Asbestos Cancer Center recently expressed concern that the unimpaireds'
claims will deplete available resources such that his clients will be left without
compensation. See Statement of Steven Kazan, supra note 34, at 28-29.
71. See Editorial, Asbestos Dreams, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2003, at A10
[hereinafter Editorial] (asserting that at least seventy-eight companies have
been driven into bankruptcy by asbestos liabilities).
72. Section 340.2 of the California Code of Civil Procedure states that a
plaintiff may bring an asbestos claim within one year of the later of the follow-
ing: a) the date of the plaintiffs disability which has been defined as permanent
termination of an individual's capacity to perform the tasks involved in his
regular occupation, see Puckett v. Johns-Manville Corp., 215 Cal. Rptr. 726, 731
(Cal. App. 1985), or b) the date the plaintiff knew or should have known that his
injuries were caused by asbestos exposure. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. §
2004
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
An additional benefit of creating an inactive docket is
that discovery for unimpaired claims is also stayed. There-
fore, the courts would have fewer cases in the discovery stage
and a less congested docket, allowing them to focus attention
and resources on the cases requiring the most attention: those
of the truly impaired.73 As a plaintiffs attorney recently testi-
fied before Congress, a defect in the asbestos litigation system
is that "[s]tate courts do not in practice require claimants to
show impairment using objective medical criteria ... The
first essential step toward solving this problem is to defer the
claims of those who are not sick, but preserve their rights to
sue, if and when they become sick in the future.
Judge Henry Needham of Alameda County recently
heard a motion for inactive docket in Alameda County, Cali-
fornia.7 ' Although Judge Needham declined to grant the mo-
tion, he did so without prejudice, stating that the issue of un-
impaired asbestos claims is "something we all should be
concerned about."77 Judge Needham denied the motion be-
cause he did not feel the moving party presented sufficient
evidence of a problem with unimpaired claims in Alameda;"
however, he stated that if he had been presented with "more
evidence that something was actually taking place in this
particular county, [he]'d be the first to get something going in
that regard."79
340.2(a)(2) (West 2004). Some argue this makes an inactive docket unnecessary
because a plaintiffs claim does not accrue until he or she has suffered "disabil-
ity" as defined by the statute, which is, in essence, impairment. However,
courts have distinguished accrual for purposes of the statute of limitations from
accrual in the sense of a claim being actionable. Buttram v. Owens-Coming Fi-
berglas Corp., 941 P.2d 71, 77 (Cal. 1997). In order to bring a claim, a plaintiff
must only have suffered "appreciable harm," so there is in fact no built-in re-
quirement of impairment in California procedural law. Id.
73. See Behrens, supra note 39, at 8.
74. See Statement of Steven Kazan, supra note 34, at 24.
75. See generally id.
76. Motion for Docket Management Order Regarding Unimpaired Cases, In
re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super. Ct. Alameda County Sept. 22, 2003) (No.
607734-9A).
77. Transcript of November 7 Hearing at 57, ln. 12, In re Complex Asbestos
Litigation (Super. Ct. Alameda County Nov. 7, 2003) (No. 607734-9A).
78. See id. at 53, ln. 4-5.
79. Id. at 53, ln. 6-8.
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E. California Law Grants Courts Authority to Implement an
Inactive Docket
The majority of jurisdictions with inactive dockets have
established such systems by order of the individual court
where the docket itself was established. 0 Section 187 of the
California Code of Civil Procedure grants California courts
broad discretion to issue case management orders and to im-
plement procedures necessary to effectively manage their
dockets:
[w]hen jurisdiction is, by the Constitution or this Code, or
by any other statute, conferred on a court or judicial offi-
cer, all the means necessary to carry it into effect are also
given; and in the exercise of this jurisdiction, if the course
of proceeding be not specifically pointed out by this code or
the statute, any suitable process or mode of proceeding
may be adopted which may appear most conformable to
the spirit of this code."
Further, the courts' authority to implement an inactive
docket is supported by section 19 of the California. Standards
of Judicial Administration, which grants courts dealing with
complex litigation 2 even greater authority to craft orders as
necessary to manage their dockets.' Section 19 states, "trial
judges should be encouraged to use their inherent powers un-
der Code of Civil Procedure Section 187 to manage complex
cases in the most efficient and expeditious manner."' Since
most courts in California have deemed asbestos litigation
"complex," such courts have authority to implement some
type of deferred registry, if prudent and necessary to tame
80. Currently, there is a pending motion to establish a statewide inactive
docket in Michigan. In re Petition For Admin. Order or Court Rule Establishing
Inactive Asbestos Docketing System (Sup. Ct. Mich. Sept. 11, 2003) (Admin No.
2003-47). In addition, legislation recently enacted in Ohio creates a statewide
inactive asbestos docket. See Asbestos-Claims-Medical Requirements, OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2505.02, 2307.91-2307.94, 2307.941, 2307.95, 2307.96,
2307.98 (effective Sept. 2, 2004) (West 2004).
81. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 187 (West 2004).
82. Rule 1800 of the California Rules of Court defines a complex case as "an
action that requires exceptional judicial management to avoid placing unneces-
sary burdens on the court or the litigants and to expedite the case, keep costs
reasonable, and promote effective decision making by the court, the parties, and
counsel." CAL. R. OF COURT R. 1800 (West 2004).
83. See CAL. R. OF COURT Standards of Judicial Admin. app. at § 19 (West
2004).
84. Id.
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unmanageable asbestos dockets.85
Under California Code of Civil Procedure section 187,
and section 19 of the California Standards of Judicial Ad-
ministration, the Northern California courts have inherent
power to manage litigation, including the power to implement
a form of an inactive docket system. In fact, the flexibility af-
forded the courts by Code of Civil Procedure section 187 is
particularly applicable in cases designated as complex litiga-
tion, such as asbestos litigation.86 Unimpaired claims and the
burden they place on the courts present a serious problem
that threatens to undermine the Northern California asbestos
litigation system. As such, some form of a docket manage-
ment system should be created now in Northern California to
ameliorate the chaos plaguing the current docket, before a
looming avalanche of future asbestos-related claims is filed.
7
III. TIMELINES FOR TRIAL SETTING AND TAKING A CASE To
TRIAL; ELIMINATION OF FAST TRACK RULES
Another major issue facing Northern California courts is
determining the appropriate pace for taking asbestos cases to
trial, particularly in light of the recent statewide elimination
of the "Fast Track" rules. In the name of efficiency, the
Northern California court system has made efforts to push
asbestos cases through the system more quickly. However,
there is evidence that expediting the trial process in fact has
the opposite of its intended effect. Some scholars who have
analyzed asbestos litigation nationwide have concluded that
creating a procedure that moves large numbers of cases
through the tort system actually encourages more cases to be
85. One provision of California law that arguably could affect the creation of
an inactive docket is California Code of Civil Procedure section 583.310 which
states, in pertinent part, "[a]n action shall be brought to trial within five years
after the action is commenced against the defendant." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
583.310 (West 2004). This statute provides for mandatory dismissal of any
claim that is not brought to trial within five years of the filing of the complaint.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.360 (West 2004). However, the five-year period in
which an action must be brought to trial is tolled (extended) by any period of
time during which prosecution of the action was stayed or enjoined. CAL. CIv.
PROC. CODE § 583.340 (West 2004); see RUTTER GROUP, CAL. PRAC. GUIDE CIV.
PROC. BEFORE TRIAL Ch. 11 at 11:203 (2004); see also Maryland Order, supra
note 49. In Baltimore, Maryland, the court simply stated that "[c]laims on the
Inactive Docket will not be subject to the provisions of Md. Rule 2-507 [5 year
statute] for so long as they remain on the Inactive Docket." Id. at 7-8.
86. See Lu v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 561, 565-66 (Cal. App. 1997).
87. See Rand Institute Report, supra note 24, at 40-48.
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filed.88
Beginning in the mid-1980's, Northern California began a
pilot program known as the "Trial Court Delay Reduction
Act,"89 or "Fast Track" system. By the early 1990s, the pro-
gram applied to all California civil cases." This set of rules
was created in response to a growing backlog of civil cases,
many of which were taking up to five years to reach trial.91
Under California Rule of Court 209, all cases were assigned to
a "Plan."9 2 Plan I meant the case had to be disposed of within
twelve months of the filing of the complaint, Plan II-
eighteen months, and Plan III- twenty-four months.93 Cases
88. Richard 0. Faulk, Dispelling the Myths of Asbestos Litigation: Solutions
for Common Law Courts, 44 S. TEX. L REV. 945, 952 (2003) (quoting Francis E.
McGovern, The Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts, 39 ARIZ.
L. REV. 595, 606 (1997)):
j]udges who move large numbers of highly elastic mass torts
through their litigation process at low transaction costs create the
opportunity for new filings. They increase the demand for new
cases by their high resolution rates and low transaction costs. If
you build a superhighway, there will be a traffic jam ....
Id. at 606.
89. These standards were adopted under the Trial Court Delay Reduction
Act of 1990, which provides in relevant part:
[t]he Judicial Council shall adopt standards of timely disposi-
tion for the processing and disposition of civil and criminal ac-
tions. The standards shall be guidelines by which the progress
of litigation in the superior court of every county may be meas-
ured. In establishing these standards, the Judicial Council
shall be guided by the principles that litigation, from com-
mencement to resolution, should require only that time rea-
sonably necessary for pleadings, discovery, preparation, and
court events, and that any additional elapsed time is delay and
should be eliminated.
CAL. GOV'T CODE, § 68603(a) (West 2004). The Trial Delay Reduction Act ap-
plies not only to unlimited but also to limited civil cases. See CAL. GOV'T CODE,
§ 68620 (West 2004).
90. See, e.g., Alameda County Gen. Order No. 13.01, In re Complex Asbes-
tos Litigation (Super. Ct. Alameda County Dec. 29, 1988) (No. 607734-9), Ala-
meda County Gen. Order No. 3.30, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super.
Ct. Alameda County Aug. 24, 1987) (No. 607734-9).
91. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
COURTS, REPORT SUMMARY: TRIAL SETTINGS, CONTINUANCES, AND CASE
DISPOSITION TIME STANDARDS: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE FAIR AND
EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL CASES (adopt Cal. Rules of Court 204 and
375.1; amend Cal. Rules of Court 208, 209, 212 and 375; amend Cal. Stds. Jud.
Admin., §§ 2 and 2.1; and repeal Cal. Stds. Jud. Admin., §§ 2.3, 2.4, and 9) (Ac-
tion Required) (Oct. 8, 2003) [herinafter Judicial Council Report Summary]; see
also CAL. CIV. PROC. § 583.310 (West 2004).
92. CAL. R. OF COURT R. 209.
93. Id.
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were presumed to be, and automatically set as, Plan I, unless
a party promptly filed a request for Plan II or Plan III. The
program was successful in some respects. By the end of 2002,
sixty-five percent of unlimited cases and eighty-five percent of
94limited cases were disposed of within one year.
Pursuant to San Francisco General Order 129, 9' all as-
bestos cases are automatically designated as "Plan II," thus
requiring them to proceed to trial within eighteen months of
filing.9" The Order also requires status and trial setting con-
ferences to be set approximately eleven months after the case
is filed.97 Finally, the order anticipates that the trial date be
set approximately six to nine months after the status and set-
ting conference date.98 Hence, there is a "rush" to get asbestos
cases to trial within the Plan II, eighteen-month period.
Has this rush to trial helped the litigants and the court,
or has it instead helped to create a traffic jam? Recently,
Designated Defense Counsel99 filed a letter brief before San
Francisco Presiding Judge Donna J. Hitchens stating,
"[s]everal years ago, the court was setting between 60-80
cases for each status conference. Currently, we are seeing
status and setting conference dates with 175 cases on the cal-
endar.""1 °
The same counsel went on to argue that only a handful of
the cases at the status and setting conferences are in fact
ready for trial.01 Furthermore, because of the increase in the
volume of filings, coupled with the rush to set those cases for
trial,
[njumerous cases are now continued from one status con-
ference to another and as a practical matter the cases are
94. Judicial Council Report Summary, supra note 91, at 3 (citing JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA, 2003 COURT STATISTICS REPORT: STATEWIDE
CASELOAD TRENDS, 1992-1993 THROUGH 2001-2002, at 52).
95. S.F. Gen. Order No. 129, supra note 8, at T 2; see also Alameda Gen. Or.
Nos. 3.30 and 13.01, supra note 90 (describing their participation in the Trial
Court Delay Reduction Act. Currently in Alameda, however, trial dates are as-
signed by Judge Henry Needham based on the court's calendar and the individ-
ual circumstances of the case).
96. "Plans" are defined in S.F. COUNTY SUPER. CT. R. 3.
97. S.F. Gen. Order No. 129, supra note 8, at 2. In November 2003, "well
over 200 cases" were designated to be addressed at a single status and setting
conference. See also Berry & Berry Letter, supra note 9.
98. S.F. Gen. Order No. 129, supra note 8, at 2
99. See infra Part IV.
100. See Berry & Berry Letter, supra note 9.
101. Id
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no longer routinely disposed of within 18 months of filing.
Cases are now being sent to trial departments and trailing
in those departments for several months. The medical
discovery becomes stale during this time period and the
litigants are unable to plan their trial schedules. '°2
In order to enable the courts and counsel to better man-
age their daunting caseloads, during 2003, Northern Califor-
nia defense and plaintiffs' counsel began discussions about
modifying the current system to schedule fewer cases for trial
at a time. The defense counsel proposed a modification that
would change the asbestos case timeline from Plan II to Plan
III, which requires that a case proceed to trial within twenty-
four months after filing. The proposed change of the asbestos
case timeline to Plan III would provide an additional six-
month period for the parties to prepare for trial and engage in
settlement discussions. At least one plaintiffs' attorney pro-
posed to defer all of the cases his firm filed with the exception
of 120 cases per month, which his firm would choose to pro-
ceed to trial. °3 Discussions on this issue are ongoing.
Since those discussions began, however, the rules under-
lying the Plan, on which the General Orders were based, were
abolished, as discussed below. Nonetheless, the timelines de-
scribed above remain in place for complex asbestos litigation.
This is true even despite the fact that the "Fast Track" sys-
tem, providing the foundation for General Order 129, no
longer applies. The next section analyzes the appropriateness
of retaining the scheduling portions of General Order 129
that push cases through to trial in spite of the abolition of the
"Fast Track" rules.
A. Blue Ribbon Panel Report on Fair and Efficient
Administration of Civil Cases
On February 17, 2003, California Supreme Court Chief
Justice Ronald M. George appointed the "Blue Ribbon Panel
of Experts on the Fair and Efficient Administration of the
102. Id. The same letter brief also explained that this "rush to trial" has the
effect of causing numerous depositions to be scheduled for any given day, as
plaintiffs depositions must be completed before the status and trial setting con-
ference. See id.
103. See David R. Donadio, Letter to S.F. Presiding Judge, Judge Donna J.
Hitchens, Proposal re: Brayton Status and Setting Conferences, at 3, Mar. 30,
2004 (on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
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Civil Cases" (the Panel).0 4 The Panel was comprised of the
Chair, Richard D. Aldrich, and a distinguished group of ex-
perts and practitioners in the field of civil procedure for court
administration."5 Specifically, Chief Justice George charged
the panel with developing recommendations to solve the fol-
lowing questions:
1. Are civil cases in the trial courts currently being man-
aged so as to promote both efficient case resolution and
the fair treatment of parties and counsels?
2. Should the Judicial Council change civil case proce-
dures and practices to promote more timely resolution of
cases?
3. Should the Judicial Council change civil procedures and
practices to facilitate the granting of reasonable requests
for time extensions and other litigation accommodations to
parties and attorneys, as appropriate to achieve the fair
administration of the civil cases? 106
After the Panel conducted research and formed recom-
mendations, the recommendations were sent to the Civil and
Small Claims Advisory Committee of California (the Commit-
tee). ' The Committee reviewed the Panel recommendations,
and on October 8, 2003, reported to the members of the Judi-
cial Council."8 The Committee generally supported the rec-
ommendations of the Panel report with only some relatively
minor modifications. 10 9
In reviewing the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act, the
Panel concluded that the Act created some significant prob-
lems. Of particular concern was the Panel's finding that cer-
tain courts were inflexible in their application of the rules, for
example: setting all cases for trial within one year; refusing to
grant continuances of trial dates where appropriate; not al-
lowing sufficient time for the disposition of cases; and, gener-
ally being too rigid in the application of the rules."0
Based on its findings, the Panel recommended the follow-
ing changes to provide a more flexible approach to managing
104. See Judicial Council Report Summary, supra note 91, at 2.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 4.
107. Id.
108. See id. at 1.
109. Id. at 1-2.
110. Judicial Council Report Summary, supra note 91, at 3.
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civil cases, to which the Committee agreed: (1) amend the
Case Management Conference rule (Rule of Court 212), (2)
amend the rules for continuances (Rule of Court 375), and (3)
amend the Trial Court Delay Reduction Act (Rule of Court
209).111
The Panel sought comments to their report from the legal
community. For the most part, the response to the Panel's
findings was positive and supportive. One comment sent to
the Panel by a law firm with extensive experience in asbestos
litigation suggested that the Panel's proposed changes should
apply to all civil litigation, including asbestos."' The Panel
replied: "[t]he case management rules will be reviewed com-
prehensively in 2003-2004... under the current case man-
agement and case differentiation scheme, complex cases are
handled differently than ordinary civil cases.' ' 3
The Panel's comment reveals its perception that asbestos
litigation may be in limbo as to which rules apply to trial
readiness. For example, there is a question as to whether the
rules for setting cases for trial and the automatic assignment
of an asbestos case to a Plan is still appropriate in light of the
elimination of the Fast Track rules. The relevant portions of
the Panel's recommendations follow.
1. Trial Setting Readiness
California Rule of Court 212, the main rule governing
management of civil cases, requires the court to review a case
no later than 180 days after the filing of the initial complaint
in order to decide whether to set it for trial.14 The Panel pro-
posed adding a new subdivision to Rule 212, which would
provide express criteria for a court to consider when setting a
case for trial."' The Panel proposed that the court should
consider:
the type and subject matter of the action to be tried,
whether the case has statutory priority, the complexity of
the issues, and the amount of discovery, if any, that re-
mains to be conducted in the case. In setting the trial
111. Seeid atl-2.
112. Id. at 75. Ms. Gabriel A. Jackson of Jackson & Wallace stated, "[I]t is
our belief that the proposed rule changes should apply to all civil litigation, in-
cluding.., asbestos...." Id.
113. Id.
114. CAL. R. OF COURT R. 212.
115. See Judicial Council Report Summary, supra note 91, at 3.
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date, the court should also consider its own calendar and
the achievement of a fair, timely, and efficient disposition
of the case.
The Panel also agreed that in setting a case for trial, the
court should consider the facts and circumstances of the par-
ticular case, including the trial dates proposed by the parties
and their attorneys, the professional and personal schedules
of the parties and their attorneys, as well as any conflicts
with "previously assigned trial dates or other significant
events.""6
All of the factors enumerated above are equally applica-
ble to asbestos litigation as to other types of civil cases.
Courts hearing asbestos cases, especially those in San Fran-
cisco, should therefore follow the logic of the Panel's sugges-
tions and consider these factors for each asbestos case (i.e.,
treat every case individually in order to achieve fairness,
timeliness, and efficiency in the disposition of the case).
Courts should discontinue their practice of treating all asbes-
tos cases as identical for purposes of scheduling and trial set-
ting.
2. Continuances of Trial
With respect to requests for continuances of trial, the
Panel suggested the repeal of California of Court Rule 375(a)
which previously stated that continuances before or during
trial in civil cases are disfavored.117 Instead, the proposed re-
placement for this rule as enacted provides: "[to] ensure the
prompt disposition of civil cases, the dates assigned for a trial
are firm. All parties and their counsel must regard the date
set for trial as certain.""8
Perhaps more significantly, the Panel proposed and Rule
375(b) has now been amended to provide that a party may re-
quest a continuance by ex-parte application as well as by no-
tice of motion."9 The Panel also proposed, and the Rule has
also now been amended accordingly, to clarify the "good
cause" necessary to obtain a continuance."' Factors that al-
low a proponent to gain a continuance after a showing of good
116. Id at 4.
117. Id.
118. See CAL. R. OF COURT R. 375(a).
119. See CAL. R. OF COURT R. 375(b).
120. See CAL. R. OF COURT R. 375(c).
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cause include the unavailability of a witness, the unavailabil-
ity of trial counsel, the substitution of trial counsel, or the ad-
dition of a new party, but only if the new party has not had a
reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery or other parties
have not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery in
regard to that new party's involvement.
121
Adhering to the logic of the Panel's recommendations, the
courts should analyze each asbestos case individually and be
more lenient in granting a continuance of trial. Rushing to
trial, especially where parties are not prepared, does not fur-
ther justice or due process. In contrast, the trial continuance
criteria recognize the importance of giving late-served defen-
dants ample opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare for
trial while still recognizing the need to move cases forward.
This is of particular concern as the problem of dealing with
late-served defendants has become a significant issue in
Northern California litigation.
122
3. Fast Track Rules
Perhaps the most significant modification the Panel sug-
gested was the elimination of Rule 209, the "Fast Track" rule.
The Panel concluded that the Rule's automatic assignment of
civil cases to Plan I for civil cases (twelve months to trial)123 is
a "source of the arbitrary assignment of many civil cases to
unrealistic trial dates."'24  Accordingly, the Panel recom-
mended repealing the section on automatic assignment to a
Plan, 2 5 as well as the automatic presumption that cases
should be assigned to Plan 1.126
The Panel's recommendations have now been adopted.
Under the revised rules, at the time of the case management
review, the trial court must review and consider statements
submitted by the parties, holding a conference where appro-
priate, and then issue an order "managing the case through to
121. See CAL. R. OF COURT R. 375(c), (d); see also discussion of this rule as it
relates to the issue of "Late-Served Defendants," infra Part III.B.
122. See infra Part III.B.
123. Asbestos cases were likewise automatically assigned, but instead to
Plan II, which allows 18 months to trial under the San Francisco General Or-
ders. Given the number of parties involved in most asbestos cases, and the
amount of discovery involved, this timeline is clearly unrealistic for the resolu-
tion of most asbestos cases.
124. See Judicial Council Report Summary, supra note 91, at 7.
125. CAL. R. OF COURT R. 209(B).
126. CAL. R. OF COURT R. 209(C).
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trial." 7 The Panel concluded that "[t]his approach should re-
duce arbitrariness and promote the individualized treatment
of every single case based on its particular facts and circum-
stances."'28
Under the Panel's rationale, automatic assignment to a
Plan is arbitrary. San Francisco's current automatic assign-
ment of asbestos cases for trial within six to nine months af-
ter the status and setting conference is as arbitrary as assign-
ing any other civil case to a Plan. The courts should follow
the Panel's logic and the Committee's rule changes and ac-
cordingly amend the related Plan provisions in the courts'
Asbestos General Orders to dispose of the system process of
automatic assignment to a Plan. Instead, each case should be
handled individually, based on its particular facts and cir-
cumstances.
B. Late-Served Defendants
1. The Practice ofLate Service
It is common practice in Northern California asbestos
litigation to identify new defendants during the plaintiffs
deposition, an event that frequently does not occur until a
month before the initial status and trial setting conference.
According to the California Code of Civil Procedure, newly
identified defendants may be substituted in for "DOE" defen-
dants at any time via a motion by plaintiffs counsel request-
ing leave to substitute in a new defendant. 9 In Northern
California, such motions are regularly granted, are often done
so ex-parte and are rarely, if ever, denied.
2. The Effect ofLate Service
Adding new defendants late in litigation reopens discov-
ery and prejudices the late-served defendants by forcing them
to prepare for trial on a curtailed schedule."O And, because
"newly discovered" defendants are occasionally added after
127. Judicial Council Report, supra note 124, at 8.
128. Id.
129. These are generally covered in the California Code of Civil Procedure,
not in the General Orders. However, S.F. Gen. Order No. 129, supra note 8, at
T 7F, does provide that late-served defendants can request further depositions
of plaintiff. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 472, 473(a)(1), 474 (West 2004).
130. See S.F. Gen. Order No. 129, supra note 8, at 9I 7F.
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discovery is closed, discovery is sometimes reopened several
times. Such reopening of discovery can even occur as late as
during trial.
Despite the late substitutions and the resulting continua-
tion of discovery, defendants are not guaranteed a continua-
tion of the trial date if one has already been set. In fact, tri-
als are rarely continued due to the addition of a late-served
defendant. The net effect of this process on an asbestos trial
is that discovery is never really complete, and a defendant
can never really be sure that it is fully prepared for trial.
A possible solution for limiting this prejudice is to have a
cut-off date for discovery, after which no additional defen-
dants could be substituted, or at which time, a case could be
required to be "at issue" as to all defendants before trial is
set. Another option is to dismiss any remaining DOE defen-
dants at the trial setting. This would force plaintiffs to timely
identify all defendants or risk being precluded from doing so.
A third alternative is for the courts to implement a rule that
if a defendant is substituted after a trial date has been set,
there is an automatic extension of the trial date. Recent
amendments to the California Rules of Court support this last
solution.
Chief Justice Ronald M. George's Blue Ribbon Panel 3 '
proposed, and Rule of Court 375(b) has now been amended to
provide that a party may request a trial continuance by ex-
parte application as well as by notice of motion.'32 The Panel
also proposed, and the rule has also now been amended to
remove any requirement of showing an "emergency" before a
court could issue a continuance. Instead, a broader list of fac-
tors was supplemented to allow a court to grant a continu-
ance based simply on a showing of good cause.
Circumstances that may indicate good cause include...
(5) The addition of a new party if: (A) the new party has
not had a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and
prepare for trial, or (B) the other parties have not had a
reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery and prepare
for trial in regard to the new party's involvement in the
case."")33
Under this new rule, continuances based on newly added
131. See supra Part III.A.
132. See CAL. R. OF COURT R. 375(b).
133. CAL. R. OF COURT R. 375(c).
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defendants would more likely be granted. If requests to sub-
stitute in a defendant after trial have been routinely granted,
requests to continue the trial should also be granted. Regard-
less of how the issue is resolved, the court's intervention is
appropriate.
C. Appropriate imelines for Asbestos Litigation?
As noted above, counsel and the courts are currently dis-
cussing how the procedure for scheduling asbestos cases
should be modified, if at all, in light of the elimination of the
"Fast Track" Rules. In the meantime, however, asbestos liti-
gants continue to face timelines that are simply unrealistic
for complex cases, which often involve dozens of defendants,
some of whom may be added immediately before trial.
Among the questions in need of immediate resolution are:
What rules will govern the timing of taking an asbestos case
to trial in light of the recent elimination of the Fast Track
rules from which the asbestos General Orders were framed?
Why would the courts do away with Fast Track rules deemed
arbitrary for civil cases, yet make an exception for asbestos
cases that are already deemed complex litigation? Why
would the modifications to Rule of Court 209 not be appropri-
ate for asbestos litigation as well? '34
Cases should proceed to trial when parties have had ade-
quate time to prepare, however long it takes. 135 And, if appro-
priate for any reason, including the addition of a late-served
defendant, trial should be continued, unless and until the
parties are ready to try the case. The practice of rushing to
set cases to trial, only to have the case assigned out to trial
departments and then trailing in those departments for sev-
eral months does not benefit anyone, and only contributes to
the current chaos in the system.
136
IV. DESIGNATED DEFENSE COUNSEL
Northern California is the only jurisdiction in the country
134. Were the courts to treat asbestos cases differently from other civil cases
on this issue, it might be advisable to consider some additional means of con-
trolling the docket. See discussion on inactive dockets, supra Part II.
135. Keep in mind that, absent a tolling agreement, every case must be dis-
missed if it is not brought to trial within five years of when the complaint was
filed. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 583.310 (West 2004).
136. See Berry & Berry Brief, supra note 5.
Vol: 45
ASBESTOS LITIGATION
where, by court order, all defense counsel are required to
utilize the services of a single law firm, called "Designated
Defense Counsel," as co-counsel for all administrative duties
related to case management, including scheduling functions
and document procurement."' This section analyzes the sys-
tem that was created over ten years ago and questions
whether it has kept up with the changing face of Northern
California asbestos litigation, or if instead it needs to be
modified to meet current demands.
A. , History of Creation ofDesignated Defense Counsel
Under section 19 of the Complex Litigation Standards in
both San Francisco and Alameda counties, the courts have
designated all death and injury asbestos exposure cases as
"complex litigation."'38 Under that authority, and beginning
in 1986, San Francisco and Alameda courts issued General
Orders establishing various rules to specifically govern com-
plex asbestos litigation. One General Order was entitled
"Designation of Defense Counsel for Discovery Purposes."
139
The purpose of the General Orders appointing Designated De-
fense Counsel (hereinafter "DDC") is to:
A. Promote a cost-effective, simple but competent system
for defendants to acquire information necessary in order to
facilitate the evaluation of these cases;
B. Curtail and prevent unnecessary and repetitious dis-
covery whenever possible;
C. Provide continuity, efficiency and economy in complet-
ing discovery procedures;
D. Encourage delegation of work responsibility in sharing
of cost to avoid unnecessary duplication and to reduce ex-
pense to the litigants;
E. Bring asbestos litigation to early and meaningful set-
tlement negotiations in each case ....
137. See Alameda Gen. Order No. 14.00, supra note 14; S.F. Gen. Order No.
41, supra note 14.
138. General Order No. 1.00, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super. Ct.
Alameda County Sept. 11, 2003); General Order No. 1, In re Complex Asbestos
Litigation (Super. Ct. S.F. County Aug. 20, 1984).
139. S.F. Gen. Order No. 41, supra note 14.
140. S.F. Gen. Order No. 41, supra note 14, at 2; Alameda Gen. Order No.
14.00,'supra note 14, at 2.
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The Orders also established that the DDC would perform
the following functions on behalf of all asbestos defendants:
(1) schedule and notice plaintiffs' depositions, after receiv-
ing a list of cases selected for deposition by the Commit-
tee;
141
(2) schedule defense medical examinations and prelimi-
nary screenings and any other necessary testing or medi-
cal reviews, after receiving the Committee's determination
of the nature and propriety of such examinations and
screenings;
(3) initiate procedures, including necessary stipulations,
authorizations, and waivers, to obtain medical and em-
ployment records and related materials;
(4) store and provide reasonable access to radiograph, pa-
thology materials, and other related medical evidence;
(5) schedule, notice, and coordinate depositions of plain-
tiffs' designated experts and jointly designated defense
experts, after receiving the Committee's determination of
which plaintiffs' experts should be deposed; and
(6) file and serve a joint defense designation of medical
experts on behalf of those defendants who so authorize.
The courts' apparent goal in creating the DDC role was to
expedite the management of complex asbestos cases by cen-
tralizing the above functions in hopes of making the handling
of asbestos defenses more efficient.
B. Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry
In approximately 1990, a fee dispute arose between the
DDC law firm... and a group of defendants who requested an
accounting of fees and costs billed and collected by DDC.'
141. A "Defense. Discovery Committee" also was contemplated in the General
Orders. This Committee was to be comprised of defense counsel who would
strategize on each case and give directives to the Designated Defense Counsel.
While this may have been effective when first created, according to local defense
practitioners, the Committee no longer meets for this purpose.
142. See S.F. Gen. Order No. 41, supra note 14, at I(C)(2-6); Alameda Gen.
Order No. 14.00, supra note 14, at T I(C)(2-6).
143. Since the creation of the General Orders establishing this position, the
same law firm, Berry & Berry, has remained in the Designated Defense Counsel
role. See Berry & Berry Law Offices, at http://www.berryandberry.com (last vis-
ited Nov. 12, 2004).
144. Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry, 267 Cal. Rptr. 896 (Cal. App.
1990).
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DDC brought a motion to compel payment of its fees, and the
defendants responded with various objections to the DDC sys-
tem. The trial court rejected the defendants' arguments and
ordered them to pay DDC's immediate, as well as future bills.
Upon reviewing the case, the Court of Appeal noted that
the issue was one of a conflict of interest - that DDC was si-
multaneously representing multiple defendants with conflict-
ing interests at the same time - which could not be dealt with
for the first time on appeal because the issue had not been
raised at the trial court level. The court stated:
our conclusion that the issue is not properly before us
should not be construed to mean that we see no conflict of
interest problem in the designated defense counsel system
as it is apparently being operated in complex asbestos liti-
gation in both San Francisco and Alameda counties.'45
Further, the Court went on to cite former rule 5-102(B) of
the California Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar
of California:
[a] member of the State Bar shall not represent conflicting
interests, except with the written consent of all parties
concerned. An attorney's simultaneous representation of
clients with differing interests poses the classic conflict
situation. A client is entitled to his attorney's unimpaired
loyalty and the danger is that an attorney representing
conflicting or potentially conflicting interests will be
tempted to favor one client over the other. "6
While this article does not explore in detail the conflict
issue as identified by the court, the practice of a single law
firm handling discovery matters on behalf of defendants with
differing interests is clearly problematic.
The appellate court disagreed with the appellants' argu-
ment that the courts did not have the authority to create the
DDC or to require all defense counsel to use DDC for the ad-
ministrative functions the courts had identified. Instead, the
court held that the court rules provide flexibility for courts
when dealing with complex litigation and that it has the au-
thority to create the DDC for that purpose:
145. Id. at 907.
146. Id. at 906 (internal citations omitted). The court further mentioned that
this rule also applies to non-legal services provided by a lawyer. Id. (citing Wil-
liam H. Raley Co., v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 1042, 1046-47 (Cal. App.
1983)).
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[t]he enumerated functions assigned to [Designated De-
fense Counsel] were primarily administrative in nature,
and the effect of the orders was not to substitute [Desig-
nated Defense Counsel] for appellants' attorney of choice.
Complex asbestos litigation involves over 2000 cases in
Alameda County and a similar number in San Francisco.
Given the burdens placed on the judicial system by that
litigation, we conclude that the trial courts acted well
within their inherent managerial powers when they ap-
pointed [Designated Defense Counsel] as designated de-
fense counsel to perform the limited functions specified in
those orders for all defendants .... 147
Finally, the appellate court addressed the appellants'
challenges to DDC's fees. The trial court had held that the
defense counsel must pay all disputed fees immediately, and
also pay all fees billed thereafter by the DDC within thirty
days of their billing. However, the appellate court again dis-
agreed. It held that the DDC's fees must be treated and ana-
lyzed like other legal counsel fees, and that the DDC must
first make a detailed showing of the reasonable fees before
the court could enforce them.4 ' Further, the appellate court
pronounced that since the trial courts had created the DDC, it
is the obligation of the trial courts to monitor the appointed
DDC. 149
Asbestos Claims Facility reinforces the need for judicial
oversight and management of the DDC in its role as adminis-
trator of all Bay Area asbestos litigation. This dynamic liti-
gation climate calls for such proactive judicial intervention in
order to ensure that the DDC system achieves the goals for
which it was created.
C. Recent Challenge to DDC
Under the San Francisco and Alameda County asbestos
General Orders, defense counsel has the right to select a new
DDC every other year. 50 No specific reason is required, let
147. Id. at 904.
148. Id. at 904-05. Designated Defense Counsel's support for its billing dur-
ing the appeal was merely a one page "Professional Billing System Summary
Report" that the appellate court found insufficient to support the Designated
Defense Counsel's request for payment. Id. at 905.
149. Id. at 905.
150. See S.F. Gen. Order No. 41, supra note 14, at I(A)(4); Alameda Gen.
Order No. 14.00, supra note 14, at $ I(A)(4); see also Certain Defendants' Re-
sponsive Statement Regarding the Initial Designated Defense Counsel Selection
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alone a showing of good cause to make the change. The only
requirement is that a group must agree to make a change.'
Pursuant to the General Orders, the court's involvement is
only mandatory where defense counsel cannot agree on a re-
placement.'52
In November 2003, a group of interested defendants in-
voked their right under the General Orders to solicit applica-
tions for a possible replacement of the current DDC."' Rea-
sons cited during a hearing on the issue included a lack of
appropriate technology currently in use by DDC"M and a gen-
eral frustration with the way DDC carries out its responsibili-
ties. '55
The Orders creating the DDC specifically limit the DDC's
role to administrative functions only, stating that DDC "shall
not be deemed an attorney for any defendant solely as a re-
sult of such activities ... ,,.5 Thus, these purely administra-
tive functions could also be conducted by non-lawyers, at non-
lawyer costs, who could utilize technology, such as web-based
sites, to keep the parties up to date on schedules in real
Meeting at 2, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super. Ct. Alameda County
Feb. 24, 2004) (No. 607734-9) [hereinafter Certain Defendants' Responsive
Statement].
151. See S.F. Gen. Order No. 41, supra note 14, at T I(A)(4); Alameda Gen.
Order No. 14.00, supra note 14, at T I(A)(4). Revised Alameda Gen. Order 14
and Revised San Francisco Gen. Order 41 state that "[i]f defense counsel cannot
agree on the procedure for the ensuing two years, the Court shall make provi-
sion for the selection." Id The term "agree" is not defined in the orders, and
there is some dispute over whether it requires unanimity or simply a majority
consensus. In addition, it is also unresolved whether this decision is to be made
by defense counsel, or by defendants.
152. Id.
153. See Notice filed by Designated Defense Counsel with both San Francisco
Superior Court and Alameda Superior Court. DDC Notice, In re Complex As-
bestos Litigation (Super. Ct. S.F. County Oct. 20, 2003) (No. 828684); DDC No-
tice, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation (Super. Ct. Alameda County Oct. 20,
2003) (No. 607734-9).
154. Although the current Designated Defense Counsel has a Web site, the
information contained therein is limited. See http://www.berryandberry.com
(last visited Nov. 14, 2004). The use of technology gives attorneys ways to
economize and save their clients money. See John S. Pierce & Beverly A.
Brand, Recent Development in Attorney Fee Disputes, 7 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 205,
234 (1994-95).
155. See Certain Defendants' Responsive Statement, supra note 150. The
conflict issue of Designated Defense Counsel was also raised during these hear-
ings.
156. Alameda Gen. Order No. 14.00, supra note 14, at III(B)(2); S.F. Gen.
Order No. 41, supra note 14, at $ III(B)(2).
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time.' These and other possible solutions to the current is-
sues with the DDC system are currently under review by the
defense.
D. Monitoring of DDC Performance
As the appellate court's decision in ACF v. Berry & Berry
suggests, it is the trial courts' obligation to be proactive in
monitoring the DDC and to ensure that the DDC's practices
are appropriate and up to date. ' Since the courts used their
inherent power to create the DDC, they must be proactive in
monitoring the DDC. One way to be proactive is to require
that the DDC enter into a service contract that spells out the
expectations for its services. Legal contracts specifying the
billing rates, work to be performed and other requirements
are the norm when hiring legal counsel.'59 Similarily, a ser-
vice contract for the DDC should also include billing expecta-
tions (e.g., billing guidelines, bills to be submitted electroni-
cally every thirty days) and could also include a requirement
that the DDC utilize technology both to keep costs down and
to keep litigants instantly informed of schedules.
The same law firm has been the DDC for ten years with
little judicial oversight of its services. Some view this as an
attempt to continue what has been an unsupervised monopoly
for ten years. The courts should instead be proactive in moni-
toring the DDC and not simply extend the monopoly era. In
doing so, the courts would provide defendants and defense
counsel with the efficiency and effective case management
that were the central goals of the General Orders.
V. PROPOSITION 51 AND BANKRUPT ASBESTOS DEFENDANTS
Proposition 51 allows defendants to limit their liability
for non-economic damages in asbestos lawsuits by implicating
third parties who may be responsible for the plaintiffs alleged
injuries.6 ° The effect of this law is increasingly important in
asbestos litigation as more and more potential defendants
157. For example, RecordTrak, a third-party document procurement vendor,
is utilized for document procurement in Northern California currently. See Re-
cordTrak, available at http://www.recordtrak.com (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
158. Asbestos Claims Facility v. Berry & Berry, 267 Cal. Rptr. 896, 905 (Cal.
App. 1990).
159. See Jim Schratz, Billing Guidelines and Fee Disputes: A Case Law Re-
view, 425 PLI/Pat 43, 48-49 (1995).
160. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2004).
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seek protection from liability under the Bankruptcy Code.16 1
However, this principle is somewhat misunderstood and un-
derutilized. This section of the article discusses the general
purpose and effect of Proposition 51, and how counsel could
better utilize its provisions to limit liability for asbestos bod-
ily injury claims.
A. Proposition 51- Background and Intent
In 1986, California citizens modified the rules of tort li-
ability in California by voter initiative, replacing the tradi-
tional rule of joint and several liability with a more equitable
approach to apportionment of damages."' California Civil
Code section 1431.2 (Proposition 51) subpart (a) states, in
pertinent part,
[i]n any action for personal injury, property damage, or
wrongful death, based upon principles of comparative
fault, the liability of each defendant for non-economic
damages shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each
defendant shall be liable only for the amount of nbn-
economic damages allocated to that defendant in direct
proportion to that defendant's percentage of fault, and a
separate judgment shall be rendered against that defen-
dant for that amount.
163
Under this modified approach, contributory wrongdoers
are still jointly liable for economic damages, but individually
are only liable for a percentage of non-economic damages in
proportion to the fault allocated to them by the jury. 164 For
example, a peripheral defendant in an asbestos bodily injury
case found to be five percent at fault would be jointly and sev-
erally liable for the entire award of economic damages, but
would only be individually responsible for paying five percent
of the non-economic award.
Proposition 51 was enacted as part of an initiative meas-
ure called the "Fair Responsibility Act" of 1986.165 Popularly
known as Proposition 51,166 the measure "was a response to a
161. See Editorial, supra note 71 (asserting that at least seventy-eight com-
panies have been driven into bankruptcy by asbestos liabilities).
162. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431 (West 2004).
163. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2 (West 2004).
164. Id.
165. See Evangelatos v. Superior Court, 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988).
166. Id. at 586.
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perceived crisis in tort law."'67 The express purpose of the
statute was "to eliminate the perceived unfairness of impos-
ing all the damage on defendants who were found to share
only a fraction of the fault."1" In other words, the initiative
was intended to protect solvent defendants with "deep pock-
ets" from having to pay large awards to plaintiffs where that
defendant's contribution to causing a plaintiffs injuries was
minimal.
Proposition 51 has been somewhat effective in the con-
text of large-scale tort cases involving numerous defendants.
Although the total amount awarded in California asbestos
verdicts has increased, the defendants remaining at the time
of trial are only being held liable for small percentages of the
total liability that correspond to their individual degree of
fault. However, as asbestos litigation has forced many defen-
dants into bankruptcy,'69 the issue of apportioning liability
under Proposition 51 has become more complicated. With
virtually all the large asbestos manufacturing defendants
now bankrupt," ' asbestos plaintiffs' counsel commonly target
"peripheral defendants" 
- companies that never manufac-
tured or sold asbestos, but who may have somehow contrib-
uted to causing the plaintiffs alleged exposure.
The large percentage of primary defendants who are now
bankrupt gives rise to several questions about Proposition
51's application and effect. First, the issue arises whether ju-
ries should apportion liability for asbestos-related injuries to
bankrupt defendants at all. Second, assuming fault should be
apportioned to bankrupt defendants where appropriate, how
does a solvent defendant ensure that all potentially liable
parties are identified in the case and that the jury under-
stands those entities' role? Finally, in the evidentiary con-
text, how should courts handle plaintiffs who have received
money from bankruptcy trusts and should solvent defendants
have access to this information? We address these issues in
turn.
B. Should Bankrupt Defendants Be Apportioned Liability
167. Miller v. Stouffer, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 454, 460 (Cal. App. 1992).
168. DaFonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 146 (Cal. 1992) (internal cita-
tions omitted).
169. See Editorial, supra note 71.
170. Id.
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Under Proposition 51?
Although no case directly addresses the issue of whether
liability can be apportioned to bankrupt entities under Propo-
sition 51, case law indicates that bankrupt entities should be
apportioned liability if they are, in fact, at fault. In Evange-
latos v. Superior Court,171 the California Supreme Court up-
held the constitutionality of Proposition 51, despite recogni-
tion that "one consequence of the statute's adoption of several
liability for noneconomic damages will be that persons who
are unfortunate enough to be injured by an insolvent tortfea-
sor will not be able to obtain full recovery for their none-
conomic losses . While the court did not directly ad-
dress the issue of apportionment of liability to a bankrupt
defendant, its constitutional analysis of the statute strongly
suggests that Proposition 51 mandates apportionment of li-
ability for noneconomic damages to all parties at fault, includ-
ing those that are bankrupt or insolvent.
In discussing the Evangelatos decision in a later case, the
California Supreme Court explicitly stated that "[w]ith re-
spect to these noneconomic damages, the plaintiff alone now
assumes the risk that a proportionate contribution cannot be
obtained from each person responsible for the injury."'73 The
indication here is that, with regard to noneconomic damages,
it is the plaintiff, rather than the solvent defendants, who
bears the risk that he or she may not be able to collect from
one or more defendants. Clearly, the focus of Proposition 51
is limiting inequitable results for the defendants, rather than
ensuring that injured plaintiffs receive the full amount of
compensation awarded by the trier of fact.
Similarly, cases have upheld the apportionment of liabil-
ity under Proposition 51 to parties that are statutorily im-
mune from having to pay for a judgment. In Taylor v. John
Crane, Inc.,7' a plaintiff alleging bodily injury caused by ex-
posure to asbestos argued that, because the Navy is immune
from paying for torturous acts, it was error for the court to al-
low the jury to allocate any fault to the Navy under Proposi-
tion 51.' The California Supreme Court rejected this argu-
171. 753 P.2d 585 (Cal. 1988).
172. Id. at 594-95.
173. DaFonte, 828 P.3d at 144.
174. 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 695 (Cal. App. 2003).
175. Id. at 698.
2004
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
ment, holding that it was proper to include the Navy in the
Proposition 51 fault allocation, despite the fact that the plain-
tiff could not recover the portion attributable to the Navy.'
7 6
The court pointed out that the Navy is not immune from li-
ability, but is simply not required to pay for its torturous con-
duct. 177 However, if the legislature creates statutory immu-
nity intending to declare that a party's conduct is not
torturous, it would then be improper to allocate fault to that
party.'
7 8
In sum, California Supreme Court rulings support alloca-
tion of fault .to bankrupt defendants. Bankrupt defendants
are not immune from liability; they are merely unable to pay
for their liability, at least not through the tort system. In
light of this fact and the rise in asbestos bankruptcies, identi-
fication of bankrupt defendants who may have contributed to
a plaintiffs injuries becomes a crucial issue in any litigation.
Because plaintiffs have little incentive to identify bankrupt
defendants, the burdens have essentially been shifted to sol-
vent defendants to conduct discovery and prove up the liabil-
ity of bankrupt entities in order to avoid increased liability
under Proposition 51.
C. Practical Effects of'Proposition 51 in the Asbestos Arena
In theory, because liability can be apportioned to bank-
rupt defendants under Proposition 51, named defendants
have the opportunity at trial to convince the jury that others
are responsible for the plaintiffs alleged injuries, essentially
pointing the finger at an empty chair. In practice, however,
this is often more difficult than it should be. More often than
not, juries do not hear the names of potentially liable third
parties. Given the number of bankrupt asbestos manufactur-
ers and distributors, why is the empty chair defense with re-
spect to bankrupt defendants?
Bankruptcy laws preclude plaintiffs from suing bankrupt
companies as potentially liable parties in their lawsuits.'7 9 In
176. Id. at 702.
177. Id.
178. The court used the example of the California Civil Code section 1714.45,
the rule that temporarily granted statutory immunity to tobacco defendants
from any liability for tobacco-related injuries. Id. at 700. This statute actually
stated that a tobacco company "commits no tort" by supplying cigarettes. Id
179. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2000) (providing for an automatic stay
upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition).
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theory though, the identities of potentially responsible bank-
rupt defendants should nonetheless come to light during dis-
covery, when parties are asked to identify all products to
which they may have been exposed during their history of
employment.8 0 However, if plaintiffs were actually identify-
ing every product to which they may have been exposed, as
well as the circumstances of every possible exposure, an as-
bestos manufacturing company should theoretically be identi-
fied in each such interrogatory response regarding the alleged
exposure history. Discussions with asbestos defense practi-
tioners reveal a prevailing belief that plaintiffs do not identify
these parties because of the effect of Proposition 51.
Thus, while Proposition 51 theoretically provides an
empty chair for asbestos defendants to point to, this defense
is significantly underutilized because the identities of bank-
rupt manufacturing defendants are not easily obtainable
through discovery. Defendants do not often use discovery mo-
tions to press plaintiffs for information about potentially li-
able third parties. As long as plaintiffs are allowed to with-
hold information or knowledge about product identification
and other issues relating to exposure, defendants will be un-
able to utilize Proposition 51 to its fullest extent. Defendants
should insist that courts enforce the General Orders' inter-
rogatories and force plaintiffs to reveal all available informa-
tion about their exposures to the named defendants in the
case.'
81
Proposition 51 places a significant burden on a defendant
hoping to implicate and have fault allocated to a third party.
Even if the plaintiff does reveal the identity of a potentially
liable third party, Proposition 51 forces a defendant to make
its own case against that third party by pursuing discovery
180. See General Order No. 129 Ex. B Defendants' Standard Interrogatories
to Plaintiff at Interrogatory Nos. 26 and 36, In re Complex Asbestos Litigation
(Super. Ct. S.F. County Nov. 10, 1985) (No. 828684) [hereinafter S.F. Gen. Or-
der No. 129 Ex. B]; General Order No. 8 Ex. A Defendants' Standard Interroga-
tories to Plaintiff at Interrogatory Nos. 30-32, 34, In re Complex Asbestos Liti-
gation (Super. Ct. Alameda County Nov. 4, 1986) (No. 607734-9) [hereinafter
Alameda Gen. Order No. 8.00] (requiring the plaintiff to disclose the details of
every alleged exposure, at work or otherwise).
181. S.F. Gen. Order No. 41, supra note 14, at 9 I(C)(1)(d); Alameda Gen. Or-
der No. 14.00, supra note 14, at $ I(C)(1)(d). "Each defendant is entitled to
move to compel responses or further responses to the interrogatories provided
the defendant has notified Designated Defense Counsel prior to filing such mo-
tion." Id.
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and finding appropriate witnesses.'82 As one would imagine,
most defendants do not have the time or resources to spend
building a case against a third-party defendant on the off
chance that a jury will accept the proffered evidence and ap-
portion some liability to the third party, thereby reducing the
named defendants' liability for non-economic damages. Some
asbestos defendants are defending hundreds of cases at a
time; as such, the focus in defending the case is economy and
efficiency, leaving little room for investigation into which
manufacturers' asbestos the plaintiffs may have been ex-
posed. However, with more and more such bankruptcies, the
original rationale behind Proposition 51 may be slowly eroded
as the economics of asbestos litigation force defendants to
forgo this important defense.
D. Proposition 51 and Bankruptcy Trusts
Discussion of bankrupt entities calls for discussion of the
impact of bankruptcy trusts. If a plaintiff has received com-
pensation from a bankruptcy trust, should defendants be
privy to the nature and amount of the award? Technically,
plaintiffs are required to disclose this information during dis-
covery;"'2 however, rather than provide this information they
often object and ultimately do not disclose it."
This information would be useful to defendants for sev-
eral reasons. Most relevant to this discussion is the fact that
it would help defendants identify potentially liable third par-
ties for purposes of pointing the finger at the empty chair at
trial. Technically, the fact that a plaintiff received money
from a bankruptcy trust is not an admission of fault on the
part of the bankrupt entity, but it is a good indicator for de-
fendants as to who else may have contributed to the plaintiffs
injuries. In addition, this information provides leverage in
settlement discussions, improving defendants' ability to value
claims against them. Without this information, asbestos de-
fendants feel that they are "negotiating in a vacuum," not
knowing whether the plaintiff has received nothing for his in-
182. See Civ. CODE § 1431.2.
183. See S.F. Gen. Order No. 129 Ex. B, supra note 180, at Interrogatory
Nos. 48-49; Alameda Gen. Order No. 8.00, supra note 180, at Interrogatory Nos.
61-62 that require plaintiffs to disclose the nature and amount of any compen-
sation received from a bankruptcy trust.
184. Common responses include, "[i]nvestigation and discovery are continu-
ing," or objections based on collateral source rule.
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juries, or whether he has already received hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars from bankruptcy trusts or other defendants,
ultimately receiving what could amount to double or even tri-
ple recovery.
E. Asbestos Defendants Should Utilize Proposition 51 to its
Full Effect
Proposition 51 provides a powerful tool for asbestos de-
fendants to limit their liability for large non-economic
awards, particularly in light of the number of potentially li-
able bankrupt entities. However, the tool is underutilized be-
cause asbestos defendants either do not have or choose not to
use the resources at their disposal to (a) identify potentially
liable third parties, or (b) use the discovery process to force
plaintiffs to reveal all available facts about their exposures.
Defendants, particularly peripheral defendants, should be far
more aggressive in pointing the finger at bankrupt entities
that may be primarily responsible for the plaintiffs' injuries.
In addition, courts should enforce the rules requiring plain-
tiffs to disclose information about alternative sources of com-
pensation they have received, thereby enabling defendants to
be informed in the handling and disposition of claims pending
against them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The time is ripe for the Northern California courts to ex-
amine the problems with the current asbestos litigation and
take control. With over 2,000 cases pending, over 800 new
cases filed each year, more than 300 cases up for trial setting
at any given time, over fifteen depositions scheduled to go
forward on any given week, and the pressure of getting all
asbestos cases to trial within eighteen months, courts are left
with an incredibly difficult task of managing their asbestos
docket and the parties with the almost impossible task of be-
ing fully prepared for trial. Northern California courts should
take action now to actively and effectively manage their as-
bestos dockets.
For these reasons, we submit that these courts should
consider the following solutions: implementation of an inac-
tive asbestos docket to limit the number of pending asbestos
claims; elimination of unrealistic timelines for taking asbes-
tos cases to trial to provide for more flexible scheduling; and
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streamlining the function of Designated Defense Counsel,
delegating administrative duties to an appropriate specialized
vendor. Additionally, Northern California defense counsel
should be more proactive in utilizing the tools available to
them, such as Proposition 51 and standard discovery proce-
dures, to help them more effectively defend their cases.
